at the time of the death. Supposing the
debt to have been paid, for instance, during the
lifetime of the debtor, he would receive nothing.
The insurance-offices, however, though this was
the law, found it to their interest not to act upon
it, and a recent decision of the courts has now
established the principle that a creditor shall
receive the value of the interest which he had at
the time of effecting the insurance, whether that
shall have been diminished or increased previous
to the debtor's doath.

"The contract of life insurance," said
Vice-Chancellor Wood, when this question was argued
before him, "is simply a contract that, in consideration
of a certain annual payment , the company
will pay at a future time a fixed sum calculated
by them with reference to the value of the premiums
which are to be paid in order to purchase
the postponed payment. Whatever event may
happen meanwhile is a matter of indifference to
the company. They do not found their calculations
upon that, but simply upon the probabitive
of human life, and they get paid the full value
of that calculation. On what principle can it be
said that if some one else satisfies the risk, on
account of which, the policy may have been
affected, the company should be released from their
contract? The company would be in the same
condition whether the object of the insured were
accomplished or not; whether he were in a better
or worse position, that would have no effect upon
the contract with the company, which was simply
calculated upon the value of the life which they
had to insure."

Mr. Blank is no doubt aware that, before
insuring his life, he will be called upon to declare
his name, residence, and occupation: whether
he has had small-pox, cow-pox, gout, liver
complaint, fits, spitting of blood, asthma, disease of
the lungs, &c. &c. Also to furnish the name of
his medical man for reference. This being the
case, let us endeavour to explain the construction
to be put upon this declaration of Mr. Blank.

An insurance company having agreed to lend a
certain person, whom we will call Smith, a sum
of money, upon the security of a reversionary
life interest to which he was entitled and a
policy on his life, desired that the latter should
be effected in some office other than their
own, though upon their application. On the
usual inquiries being made as to Mr. Smith's
health, they referred the office to whom they
applied to his medical man, and to an intimate
friend of his, for information. From both
of these persons favourable replies were received,
but the office, nevertheless, declined to grant the
policy. Application having been subsequently
made to another company upon the same basis,
strengthened by a statement from Mr. Smith
himself that he was in a good state of health, the
policy was granted. In the course of time, Mr.
Smith died, and the policy was disputed, on the
ground that a false representation had "been made
of his state of health. The Court of Queen's
Bench decided that neither was Smith himself,
nor were the referees, to be looked upon as
agents of the insurers, so as to affect them by any
misrepresentation which they might have made.
There were other points raised as a matter of
course, but upon this particular argument Lord
Campbell said: "The admission that the referees
were the agents of the insured would entirely
prevent a life policy from being a security on
which a man could safely rely as a provision for
his family, however honestly and however
prudently he may have acted when the policy was
effected:" and this was afterwards confirmed by
the Court of Appeal.

Although the statements of the referees, however,
do not necessarily bind the insurer, any
declaration he may make himself, when embodied
(as it usually is) in the policy, has a widely different
effect. It then becomes the keystone of
the fabric, and if found unsound will endanger
the whole.

Thus, an Irishman who had insured his life
declared that none of his near relations had died
of consumption, and that his life had never been
accepted or refused by any other office; whereas,
two of his sisters had died consumptive, and he
had actually insured his life in another office.
He declared, moreover, that if any circumstance
material to the insurance had not been truly
stated, or should have been misrepresented or
concealed, the policy should be considered void.
The policy after his death was very reasonably
disputed; but, the question having been tried in
an Irish Court, and the judge having directed
the jury to find for the company, only if the
statements were false and material, they were
considered to be not false and material. The
House of Lords, to whom the question was
subsequently referred, without expressing any opinion
upon this estimate of falsity and materiality,
decided that the judge was wrong. He ought
to have directed the jury to find a verdict for
the company, they said, if the statements were
simply false, and were made in obtaining the policy.
It must be clear, however, that the statements
made by Mr. Blank in effecting his policy are
wholly false before the company can take advantage
of his misrepresentation.

Isaac Thomas Perrins, when insuring his life
described himself, with a pardonable flourish, as
Isaac Thomas Perrins, Esq., of Saltley Hall,
Warwickshire. He did live at the Hall, and, for all we
know, he may have been an esquire. He was also,
however, an ironmonger, and kept a shop. In his
policy was contained a condition that, if any statements
in the proposal were untrue, it (the policy)
should be void. The company, taking advantage
of Mr. Perrins's little flourish, and of his
obliviousness about the shop, disputed the policy—
and almost with success. The judges were not
means of one mind, however. Lord Chief
Justice Cockburn thought, with regret, that he
was bound by the case in the House of Lords, to
which we have referred, and that, the statement