universal suffrage as the only thing henceforth possible in Europe, but also generally for the holy brotherhood
of peoples and the solidarity of nations (so run the phrases now in vogue with them), they have forgiven, him
his not less decisive rejection of socialism. But their voices are loud for war. They told M. Kossuth in
their address, that could they have had their wishes while the struggle was yet going on, the intervention
of Russia would not have been met alone by protests upon paper, but upon the field of action-by the force
of British arms; so much the more, therefore, are they now eager for that extremity, when it comes to them
fraught not alone with the chances of freedom for Hungary, but with the certainty of a European revolution
that will alter all the destiuies of the world, and carry all the points of the charter. It is somewhat curious
that the only part of the population that in some sort shares these extreme opinions, yet has resolutely
withheld from any shows of agreement with the immediate object of their homage, is that very part which
was itself most recently on the verge of rebellion. Ireland has offered no sympathy to M. Kossuth. The
Young Irelanders have been coldly arguing on his merits, while the Old Irelanders openly denounced him.
The organ of that section of the latter which speaks most directly at the bidding of the priests, marked him
at once with the sign of the beast, as a conspirator against his Holiness the Pope. It proclaimed him to be a
kind of smaller Cromwell, without his military genius, and without his practical sincerity. It discovered a
parallel to Jellachich fighting against him, in the old Irish chieftains fighting against our English Commonwealth;
and would of course complete the parallel by comparing the coalition of the Ban and the Emperor in
1849, to that of the Irish Confederation and Charles the First in 1641. To this organ of public opinion M.
Kossuth appears the frantic disturber, and the Emperor of all the Russias the true pacificator, of Europe. Nor
does it scruple to sum up finally, and in one fatal word, the arch-agitators crime. His object is to protestantise
Hungary; and such a diabolical object would of course render any man, capable of entertaining it, capable
also of fraternising with any party or principle able to render him, or even promise him, any service. Which
would fully account for M. Kossuth being anti-jesuit with Exeter Hall, socialist with the Socialists, red
republican with the Romans and French, constitutional with the English monarchists, destructive of local
privileges and independence with the inhabitants of Croatia, and municipal with the corporations of England.

Participating somewhat in this view of the great Hungarian's versatility, but objecting to him on larger
grounds, the more important class of his opponents now come within view. They admit the extraordinary
cleverness, the wonderful tact he has displayed; but they question altogether his moral pretensions; accuse him
of reckless designs of personal ambition; denounce his plans as of the deepest die of red revolution; and, in
regard to Hungary, express their belief that it was his violent innovations which rendered her old constitution
no longer possible; and that, but for his inveterate assaults on the integrity of the monarchy, the country never
would have undergone the miseries of foreign intervention. This party holds that the best blood and talents of
Hungary were alienated from the side of Kossuth when he pronounced the formal deposition of the House
of Hapsburg; and that when, yet earlier in the struggle, he relieved the peasantry from the robot, or
obligation of personal service, it was done far less as an expedient of statesmanship, than as a republican
declaration of the rights of man. Hence they accuse him of a purposed design, from the first, to dismember
the empire; they say it was to maintain his own supremacy, in and by the revolution, that he forced matters
to the last extremity; and they assert that, but for this design, the liberties of Hungary might have been
secured, and her constitution established on a permanent basis. Then, as to his present crusade for a general
European rising, which they declare to be now his only chance of being ever recalled to Hungary, they
meet this by arguments addressed chiefly to those members of the Peace Society who so precipitately
enlisted under his banners. They say that England has already had considerable experience on the subject
of intervention in foreign countries, for the purpose of establishing what she calls order and freedom,
propagating constitutional ideas, adjusting balances of power, and reforming mankind generally after her own
English model. For example, they point out that she interfered to deliver France from Bonaparte; that
she interfered to restore Italy to the Pope; that she helped largely to restore the Peninsula to its legitimate
possessors; that she has successively subsidised and assisted, not simply the smaller continental states, but
Russia herself, Austria, and Prussia; that she interfered to give liberty to Greece, and bless her with a
king that has hated us ever since; that she interfered to save Turkey from being swallowed up by Mehemet
Ali; that she interfered to give Belgium to the King of Holland, and afterwards to take her away again and
make her independent; and that in short it is difficult to say where she has not interfered, what Government
she has not thwarted or befriended, what people she has not backed up against their ruler, what ruler she
has not assisted against his subjects. And then they ask she has to show for it all?—which brings in
some rather long-faced figures. Of twelve hundred millions spent on "national defences" alone during the last
century, it turns out that more than half are swallowed up by the single item of a fourteen years' actual war;
and of some fifty additional millions paid in the way of subsidies during twenty-two years of this period,
it appears that our foreign allies received upwards of thirty millions during the ten years before Bonaparte's
final defeat. Nor did even such sacrifices, by which we have hampered ourselves with centuries of debt, make
friends of those we would have served. What we would have permanently established, already has passed away;
and nowhere are we so unpopular, with peoples or with courts, from none do wo so frequently receive contempt
or insult, as from those former recipients of our costly and heroic bounty. From all which the inference follows
that it would be madness to plunge into another long revolutionary war, of which the issues would be wholly
beyond our own control, for the uncertain aim of assisting another country to those privileges of
constitutional freedom which she would in all probability employ, like the rest, in disregarding our counsels,
insulting our countrymen, and dismissing our ministers.

Such are the various opinions called forth by the Kossuth crusade, and to these we have to add yet another
class, in some respects distinct from all that have been cited, yet likely to be not uninfluential in
determining what amount of enduring influence may outlive the temporary excitement he awakened. Within this
range of opinion fall those who have sympathised throughout with the resistance of Hungary as a constitutional
struggle, who think her existence still possible as a monarchy with liberal institutions, and who are not
yet disposed to see these chances merged in a general European conflict between the rival powers of Absolutism
and Freedom. They admit the genius and capacity of the great leader of the Hungarians, but they are
startled by bis versatility, and somewhat doubt his straight-forwardness. In common with all the world,
they appear to have been charmed by his first speeches at Winchester and Southampton. The wonderful
power he had acquired in his Eastern prison of expressing himself in English; the moderation of his tone;