referred at much detail to the last series of blue books
on the Turkish question; arguing, first, that Lord J.
Russell had not replied to the first proposal for the
partition of Turkey with sufficient indignation; secondly,
that Lord Clarendon, when he became foreign secretary,
had treated that idea still more gently, expressing a
readiness to discuss it further; thirdly, that secret and
confidential despatches were communicated to the Times,
even before they were known to the whole cabinet—a
charge which he sustained by a variety of internal
evidence and comparison of dates and phrase; and,
fourthly, that the members of the cabinet were divided
in their opinions and discordant in their speeches. He
then criticised the course of the government towards
Prussia and Austria, and towards Turkey itself, where
their assumed friendship had taken very disagreeable
shapes. Declaring his belief that their preparations for
war had been late, and were still very deficient, and
that their whole policy was vague, indefinite, and planless,
the hon. member drew the inference that some
perverse spirit thwarted their councils and frustrated
their efforts, recommending them, as the only means of
averting ultimate disgrace, to "throw the Jonah
overboard."—Mr. Bright wished to exonerate himself from
any responsibility arising from a war in which he could
not concur. He considered it neither just, wise, nor
necessary, and cited a number of details from published
despatches and other means for the purpose of supporting
that conclusion. Turkey, he argued, was the centre of
intrigues, and a scene of corruption. There was nothing
in the demand of Russia which the Sultan ought to have
refused, and would not have conceded, if he had not
fancied that a war, with England and France for
supporters, was advantageous to his interests. The British
government and ambassador should have insisted on the
acceptance of the Menschikoff ultimatum or the Vienna
note. War would then have been averted, England
saved from a terrible and costly conflict, and Turkey
much more benefited in the end than by any battles we
could fight for her integrity. Speaking on behalf of the
special interests of this country, the hon. member
upheld the policy of the strictest non-intervention.—Mr.
J. Ball approved of the war, not for the sake of the
integrity of Turkey, or the equilibrium of Europe, but
in vindication of public justice. Fought for that object,
the present contest would, he thought, furnish a lesson
to the world from which future sovereigns might learn
that, even among nations, honesty was the best policy.—
The Marquis of Granby believed that the Emperor of
Russia was not the only disturber of the peace of Europe.
France had set the example of interfering with the internal
administration of Turkey, and another cause of disturbance
arose from the civil war carried on between the members
of the cabinet.—Lord D. Stuart wished to obtain from
the government a more explicit declaration of their general
objects in beginning war, and trusted that they would
show more vigour in their acts now it was begun than in
their councils heretofore. The proceedings in the Black
Sea furnished, he feared, a bad specimen, showing little but
dilatoriness and negligence, of which the enemy had
taken great advantage. He hoped that no peace would
be concluded before the claws of Russia had been
effectually clipped.—Lord Palmerston submitted that a
more appropriate occasion might have been found or
made for criticising the details of past diplomacy, as
some preceding speakers had done. He only followed
their lead so far as to remark upon, and deny, the
charge that cabinet secrets had been revealed to the
newspapers. Looking at the question with a wide view,
he observed that the aggressive policy of Russia towards
Turkey was of long standing, had been steadily pursued,
and could not be blamed if prosecuted without concealment,
subterfuge, or fraud. But this, he contended, had
not been the case in the recent transactions. The
reason why the particular moment was chosen by the
Czar for his last aggression lay in the discordances then
existing, or believed to exist, among the western
powers. He speculated on the presumed impossibility
of cordial union between England, France, and Austria.
European difficulties were considered to be Russia's
opportunity, and the occasion was seized for making
another attempt at aggrandisement, at the expense of
Turkey. Arguing, in reply to Mr. Bright, that the
demands of Russia struck at the very roots of Turkish
independence, and that the events of the last year
showed her condition to be the very reverse of that
state of decadence which it had been accused of being,
the noble lord proceeded to rebut the allegations
founded on religious principles, and which charged the
government with fighting the battles of Mahometanism
against the Christians. The Mussulman was the only
rule that could combine the scattered provinces and
different sects of Turkey into one kingdom. But we
were not contending on the question who should govern
that empire, but who should not govern it, and to keep
it from falling into the grasp of Russia. Declining to
attempt a detailed definition of the "balance of power,"
he characterised it as common-sense, sagaciously
exercise in self-defence, to avert hostility before it arrived
at our doors. He could not concur in treating the
question as one of mere profit and loss. Higher aims
were before us, and the country was now arming to
prevent the civilised world from falling prostrate at the
feet of a single power—to defend the liberties of Europe
and the independence of nations.—Mr. Disraeli
supported the address, and cited a speech of Mr.
Canning for the opinion that no dissent from the policy
of a ministry or censure upon their conduct, should
warrant the members of the opposition in obstructing
measures taken for the defence of the country. Declaring
his intention of following that injunction at present,
the right hon. member proceeded to remark upon the
dissonances which existed in the views of different
ministers. There were evidently two opinions in the
cabinet upon every branch of the subject. The epithets
they applied to the war, the objects they indicated for
it, the prospects they drew of its course and results,
above all, their appreciation of Turkey and her
possibility of future prosperity, were hopelessly irreconcileable
with each other. Glancing at the Nesselrode
"memorandum" drawn up in 1844, he contended that it showed
the existence, even at that early date, of an agreement
between the Czar and the British government, involving
nothing less than an absolute partition of Turkey, in
which France was not admitted to a share. If not
actually an agreement, that document amounted to one
of those "gentlemanly understandings" which the
Emperor Nicholas avowedly preferred, especially when
dealing with an old friend. Was that memorandum
ever answered, or its evident inferences disclaimed?
Adverting to the more recent correspondence, Mr.
Disraeli denied that the Czar could be charged with
duplicity; his objects were avowed, and his language
frank. If ambition and aggression were made offences,
neither England nor France could come into court with
clean hands. To prevent Constantinople from falling
into the hands of Russia was a just cause of war; but
Lord Aberdeen and that section of the divided cabinet
who concurred with him in believing Turkey defunct or
dying, could not reasonably call on the country to
support them in conducting it. It was remarkable that
the partition project, which had slept for nearly ten
years, revived in the mind of the Czar a few hours after
he heard that Lord Aberdeen had succeeded Lord Derby
as Prime Minister. Mr. Disraeli then reverted to the
despatches, from whose contents he drew the subject
for copious strictures upon the language and conduct of
the cabinet. He concluded by drawing a hypothetical
sketch of a course of policy which he believed would
have been more firm and successful in avoiding the
fearful contingencies to which we were now committed.
—Lord J.Russell briefly replied to the various
censures which had been passed upon the government in
the course of the debate.—After a few words from
Colonel Sibthorp, the address was unanimously
adopted, and, on the motion of Lord J. Russell, it
was agreed that it should be presented to her Majesty
by the whole house.

On Monday, April 3, on the order for going into
committee on the Bribery Bill, Mr. V. Smith moved
that the bill be referred to a select committee, intending
to propose, if this motion were agreed to, that the
bribery prevention bill and the controverted elections,
&c., bill should be referred to the same committee. The
questions involved in these three bills, he observed,
concerned not merely the convenience, but the character