he could not understand how any members of the
government which commenced the war should suddenly
assume the language of the Peace Society. He
examined at some length the propositions of Russia, and
contended that they were more dangerous to Turkey
than was the state of things before the war began. He
did not dispute that the allied propositions were also
inadequate, and he thought all this proved how fortunate
it was that the conferences were broken off. But,
before coming to that point, he would press upon the
advocates of the Russian terms to consider what they
were doing. Every speech delivered in that strain
served to nerve the Russian arms, and to encourage
Russian resistance. What could Russia infer from these
propositions, supported by names of such high influence in
the country, but that they foresaw the speedy exhaustion
of English resources, and the relaxing of English vigour.
He did not question the patriotism of these gentlemen,
but it did seem to him that they were serving the cause
of the enemy. Coming to the resolutions before the
house, he could not properly support either of them.
He objected to the amendment of Mr. Lowe, that it was
not only an interference with the prerogative of the
crown, but that it was a needless interference with the
free action of this house. With regard to the future
policy of the war, he recommended the government to
use less supplicating language to Austria; to leave her
alone, and we should speedily bring her to us on our
own terms. He strongly deprecated a war of nationalities,
which he objected to not because it would establish
republics, but because he was sure this government
would be unable to establish in liberty the promises it
wrote in blood. Let us (said Sir E. Bulwer in conclusion)
adhere rigidly to the objects for which we commenced
the war—the maintenance of the independence and
integrity of Turkey, with such guarantees as statesmen
might project, and victory enable us to accomplish. As
to the means by which those securities were to be
obtained, that was not the affair of the House of
Commons. The strategy of the war must rest with
the allied cabinets, whose plans must be executed by
councils of war. But though the end of the war should
be purely protective, it was impossible that the means
employed should be purely defensive. If we would
drive Russia into our terms, we must cripple her where
she could be crippled. It was true, as had been said in
the course of the debate, that we could not crush the
power of Russia in Russia. But when she pretended to
be more than Russia, we could and must deprive her of
the means by which she sought to overleap the tangible
barriers which separated from Europe a power which
united the arts of Machiavelli to the armies of France. In
that sense we could and would, by the blessing of heaven,
crush the power of Russia to invade and destroy Turkey.
Mr. Gibson had sought to alarm them by dwelling
on the infinite duration of the war. But the war would
not be long if we would only be in earnest, and would
limit ourselves strictly to the pursuit of its legitimate
objects. In these days war was money, and it was
impossible for any nation to sustain a long war with a
short purse. The resources of Russia were now being
fast exhausted. There was no country in which recruiting
was so costly, or in which it imposed so severe
a burden upon the owners of the soil by taking away
their serfs, and by restricting commercial intercourse,
and thus preventing the replacement of capital. She
might dissemble to the last. But peace would come
suddenly and knock loudly for admission at that door
which we had not closed against peace, but against a
felonious counterfeit, which would steal through disguised
under her garments, and with a concealed sword
in her hand. Mr. Gladstone had talked of the verdict
of history upon the transactions now passing around us.
Allow me (said Sir Edward) to anticipate the verdict
which history will pronounce. Allow me to suppose
that the time will come when some philanthropist will
ask what service we in our generation have conferred
on the human race—suppose he were some one trained
in the schools of Oxford or the institutes of Manchester.
It might be said that there was a power commanding
an army as numerous as the hordes of Xerxes; embodying
all the forces of barbarism, and lying upon the
outskirts of civilisation; left there to develope her own
internal resources, unmolested by any state, though all
dreaded her power and policy. Long pent up by nature
in her own legitimate domains, she ever strove for an
outlet to gratify her ambition. She crept to her object
by the dissimulating guise of successive treaties, which
promised peace, but graduated spoliation by the
opportunities of war. At length, upon pretexts too gross to
deceive the common sense of mankind, that power
proceeded to break through the limits which had hitherto
confined her. Then I trust, sir, that the historian will
say that in our generation we, the united families of
England and France, made ourselves the vanguard of
an alarmed and shrinking Europe, and did not sheathe
the sword until we had redeemed the pledge which we
had given to humanity on the faith of two christian
sovereigns, and had obtained the objects which justice
and liberty require.—The LORD ADVOCATE concurred
in almost every sentiment expressed by Sir E. L. Bulwer.
He thought the peace party were to blame for the origin
of this war; and when Mr. Gibson attributed the origin
of the war to the articles of the press, which persuaded
Russia that there would be no cordial union between
England and France, he forgot that this was really an
admission that Russia was only waiting for an
opportunity to attack Turkey. He then at some length
defended the policy of the government.—The debate was
adjourned till the next day.

On Tuesday, June 5, the debate was resumed by Mr.
COBDEN, who, after clearing away certain preliminary
objections to the course which he and his party had
taken upon this question, declared that they had dealt
with the honest interests of England, and he maintained
that its just interests were in harmony with the interests
of the whole world. He expressed his astonishment at
the speech of Sir W. Molesworth; he had never heard,
he said, a speech so utterly at variance with all the
previous declarations of the speaker. He excepted to
Sir W. Molesworth's statement of the question, which
really was, he insisted, whether the plan proposed by
the government was the best and only plan that could
be devised, and whether the difference between the plan
proposed by Russia and that proposed by our government
was such as to warrant the recommencement of
the war. He compared the two proposals, pointing out
what he conceived to be the shortsighted policy which
had dictated the terms offered to Russia, and which
might be detected, he said, in the protocols. He urged
the apparent inconsistency between the language of
Lord J. Russell in that house and at Vienna, and that
Lord John had misapprehended the bias of public
opinion in Germany with regard to the war, to which
he believed it was adverse. If the English people had
the conscription, as in Prussia, they would be a little
more chary how they called out for war. After the
treaties which had confined Russia to her own territories,
why not have contented ourselves with sending
our fleet to the Black Sea, and refusing to enter upon
land operations until the great powers of Germany were
willing and ready to join us, instead of taking upon
ourselves to fight the battle of civilisation for the whole
world? What were we now fighting for? To reduce,
it was said, the preponderance of Russia in the Black
Sea. But that preponderance resulted from her commerce
and her vast shipments of produce there, and, so
long as these continued, all the powers on earth could
not take it away. Germany had been detached from
us; what might be the consequence if, by and by, it
should be proved that the war was opposed to the
inclination of the government and people of France?
After a highly unfavourable review of the prospects of the
ensuing campaign in the Crimea, Mr. Cobden contended
that the war had been recommenced upon a point of
difference almost infinitely minute; that the invasion
of Russia by a land force was an infatuation; that we
had attempted too much; and, in obedience to a cry
out of doors, had undertaken a task more difficult than
any nation had ventured upon before. He blamed the
government for having played falsely and treacherously,
and warned them that there would be a heavy
reckoning for them hereafter.—Mr. COLLIER supported the
amendment of Mr. Lowe.—Lord H. VANE looked with
great apprehension at a continuance of the war, and,
if a favourable occasion offered, he hoped the government