was done and said by the right hon. gentleman himself.
When the expedition to the Crimea was propounded by
the government—for it was propounded by the government,
and not by the generals—the Duke of Newcastle
wrote a despatch to Lord Raglan, in which he said that
there could be no peace for Europe until Sebastopol was
taken and destroyed. That was the statement made by
the government, and for that statement I hold the right
hon. gentleman responsible. When the conferences at
Vienna ended—I don't mean the day before yesterday
—but when they ended in reality, before that sham
scene was enacted in this house, had Sebastopol then
fallen? I will allow that the Russian fleet had been
destroyed, but suppose that at that moment we had
made peace,—I ask this house, and I ask every thinking
man, what would have been the result of such a
proceeding? Would it not have been the universal opinion
in the East that England and France had been
conquered: would it not have been the general opinion
there that the fleets and armies of France and England
had retired with disgrace and discredit: would it not
have been plain to the smallest tribe in the East that
we had left the Crimea because we could not take
Sebastopol, and because we could not obtain the objects
for which the war was entered into? Yet this is the
conduct which the right hon. gentleman asks us to
pursue. Suppose we had made peace, as the right hon.
gentleman would have had us, would Europe have been
safe—would the Turkish empire have been safe? True
it is that the Russian army had retired beyond the
Pruth—that it had evacuated the Principalities—but
what security have we that in two years afterwards she
would not have been across the Danube again? What
does the house think of the political morality which
would recommend us to undertake a war to obtain such
paltry ends as those with which the right hon. gentleman
is satisfied? The right hon. gentleman is one of those
who cannot plead unwariness in the resolutions he
takes. What he does he does with great deliberation.
I don't say that he always acts prudently; but that, if
he acts imprudently, it is with his eyes open. It was
with his eyes thus open that he undertook this war;
and for what did he induce the people of England to
leave their peaceful avocations, and sacrifice their blood
and treasure? Was it simply that the Russian should
retire beyond the Pruth, keeping all his armies and his
power intact and as great as ever, and with the reputation
of England and France reduced? That is all we would
have obtained by following the right hon. gentleman's
advice. We should, indeed, have had a peace, but a
dishonourable peace, and our power would have been
weaker than when we entered into the war." Mr.
Roebuck then adverted to Lord J. Russell's language at
the Vienna conferences, and said, "A minister of
England really understanding the position of his country
and the part that Austria was playing, would have
whispered in the ear of the latter power talismanic
words which, when I name them, I know will rouse the
voice of members of this house against me. But I am
as sure as I am of my own existence that the time will
come when the three words which I would have
mentioned to Austria shall be the watchwords of freedom
and the forerunners of good government in Europe.
The words I mean are 'Poland, Hungary, Italy.' It
may be said that I am now arousing nationalities. Sir,
I take the part of nationalities against despots always;
and I believe that Austria, if these words had been
whispered in her ear, would have understood her
position, and would not have played fast and loose as
she has done with the people of this country and of
France, but would have trembled before the spirit that
would have been conjured up before her at the sound of
those names. I know what I incur by the statement I
now make, but although, feeble as I am, I cannot
maintain as I would wish the belief that I put forth, yet
I am strong in the conviction that these three words are
talismans to Europe." Mr. Roebuck concluded by
expressing the hope that "as we entered into this war,
so we shall continue it—that we shall be firm, bold,
straightforward—that what we gain we shall in no self-
denying spirit unwarily give up—that in the cause of
civilisation against barbarism, of Europe against Russia,
what we acquire honestly by our arms we shall maintain
firmly by the same means—that, our object being to
cripple Russia, what we take we shall keep. These are
significant phrases, and I mean them to be such. To
cripple Russia we are not to consider her honour, but
we are to consider mankind as our allies in the struggle,
and that in crippling Russia we are fighting the battle
of mankind, and benefiting the whole human race."—
Mr. S. HERBERT defended the course adopted by the
ex-ministers, and urged that they had supported and
aided in carrying on hostilities under the belief that the
war was strictly defensive, and were justified in opposing
it now that its character was changed. After adverting
to the confusion of ideas and conflict of opinions on the
subject of the war, he argued that the objects for which
we first engaged in the conflict were sufficiently attained,
and commented upon the absurdity of prolonging the
struggle merely for the purpose of humbling a power
whom we were still inviting to become once more our
friend. Contending that the successes obtained against
Russia had been undervalued, while our own disasters
were exaggerated, Mr. Herbert remarked that if now
some splendid triumph were achieved in the field, the
country, in the fulness of its satisfaction, would accept a
peace without examining the conditions too closely.
He referred to incidents in the campaign of last year,
and read extracts from despatches to prove that he had
not been idle or indifferent while in office, and then
proceeded to analyse the propositions presented at the
Vienna conferences, with the view of showing that they
contained the elements of a safe and honourable peace.
—Mr. DRUMMOND confessed to a change of opinion, but
in a reverse direction to that experienced by the late
secretary at war. Having begun by deprecating war,
he now felt convinced that we must continue to prosecute
it. Proceeding to criticise the conduct of ministers, the
professed objects of the war, and the opinions propounded
by different members, he found proof of incompetence,
futility, and inability on all sides. Whatever might be
the fortunes of the conflict in detail, he believed that
the inevitable result of the war would be to destroy
Mahometanism, and to leave the French masters of
Constantinople.—Mr. BRIGHT complained that, under
the secret system of diplomacy, the house was debarred
from the discussion of many important questions until
events had been decided, and the time for useful
interference gone by. This he observed had been the case
last year, and at present. They were not allowed to
discuss the war until it was proclaimed, or the conferences
until they were concluded. Peace, he argued,
should be advocated by those who believed that the
objects of the war had been attained, as well as those
who considered them not worth attainment at the cost
of bloodshed. Examining the ostensible purpose of the
war, as explained in the speeches of ministers, the hon.
member contended that nothing definite could be elicited.
We did not fight for nationalities, nor for conquest, nor
for any serious destruction of the Russian power. The
only practical object presented to us was the security of
Turkey, and this it was confessed by the government
themselves could not be absolutely, but only conditionally
obtained. He then argued, and decided in the affirmative,
the question whether the basis on which Russia
proposed to settle the "third point" offered the means
of such conditional security. On the other hand, the
demand of a limitation of the Russian armaments in the
Euxine was humiliating to Russia and ineligible as a
principle of pacification. Even if the propositions of the
allies were somewhat preferable to those of Russia, was
the difference, he asked, worth the sacrifices and the
bloodshed consequent upon a continuance of the war?
On all accounts he denied that the government were
justified in breaking off the conferences upon such
considerations and declared that they had proved themselves
guilty of rash and inexcusable recklessness. Mr. Bright
afterwards enlarged upon the serious consequences which
war was entailing on the country in the exhaustion of its
resources, and the enhancement debt and taxation. At
present we were spending 75 millions a year more than
sufficed to carry on the government of the United States,
our nearest rival in commercial competition. If the war
lasted six years, as anticipated by Sir W. Molesworth,
we should have a burden of 450 millions to embarrass
us in the race. Declaring that he had no confidence in