period that the admiral commanded the fleet in the
Baltic. The letters range from the date of Sir C.
Napier's appointment in February last year to that of
his return to Kiel in November. The following are the
passages of the correspondence most immediately
connected with the breach between the Minister and the
Admiral:—

On the 1st of May, Sir J. Graham advises Sir C.
Napier, in the first instance, to feel his way, and to
make good his hold in the Gulf of Finland. "When I
say this, I by no means contemplate an attack either on
Sweaborg or on Cronstadt. I have a great respect for
stone walls, and have no fancy for running even screw
line-of-battle ships against them. Because the public
here may be impatient, you must not be rash; because
they, at a distance from danger, are fool-hardy, you
must not risk the loss of a fleet in an impossible
enterprise." Sir James adds, that he believes "both
Sweaborg and Cronstadt to be all but impregnable from the
sea—Sweaborg more especially—and none but a very
large army could co-operate by land efficiently, in the
presence of such a force as Russia could readily concentrate
for the immediate defence of the approaches to her
capital." He advises the Admiral, then, if he has none
but naval means at his command, to "pause long, and
consider well, before he attempts any attack on the
Russian squadrons in their strongholds, being afraid that
they were much too cautious to come out and meet him.
Had you been weaker," Sir James observes, "they
might have done so. Now they will wait, and watch
an opportunity, in the hope that you will seriously
cripple your force, by knocking your head against their
forts, when they may take you at a serious disadvantage,
and inflict a fatal blow. These considerations must not
be overlooked by you; I recall them to your mind lest,
in the eager desire to achieve a great exploit, and to
satisfy the wild wishes of an impatient multitude, you
should yield to some rash impulse, and fail in the
discharge of one of the noblest of duties, which is, the
moral courage to do what you know to be right, at the
risk of being accused of having done wrong. You will
reflect on it, and I am certain that your judgment will
not err.—I am, my dear Admiral, yours sincerely, J. G.
GRAHAM."

In several subsequent letters Sir James Graham
reiterates similar sentiments, advising prudence and
caution.

On the 11th of July, after speaking of Bomarsund as
a fortress which it is feasible to attack, Sir James repeats
his advice to be cautious. "Sweaborg, if it were
possible, would be a noble prize, but on no account be led
into any desperate attempt, and, above all things, avoid
the least risk of the Russian fleet slipping out of the
Gulf of Finland when your back is turned; and be slow
to land your marines, without whom your line of battle
is disabled. The Russians, though shy, are crafty; and,
if they can catch you at a disadvantage, they will be
down upon you. With 50,000 troops and 200 gun-boats
you might still do something great and decisive before
the end of September."

On the 22nd of August Sir James congratulates the
Admiral on the successful attack of Bomarsund; and, on
the 25th, he says: "I am more than satisfied with your
proceedings. I am delighted with the prudence and
sound judgment which you have evinced. It would
have been a miserable want of firmness had you yielded
to clamour, and risked your ships, and sacrificed many
valuable lives, in an attempt to destroy, by naval means,
works which were certain to fall to an attack by land.
The work has been well done, and I gladly give you the
utmost credit for it."

On the 17th of October, Sir James Graham, in answer
to a letter from the Admiral, writes: "You refer to my
letters at the end of August, as contemplating then the
early termination of active operations in the Baltic for
this year. I was not prepared, even at that time, for
the immediate departure of the French army after the
capture of Bomarsund, and I pointed out to you Abo,
Sweaborg, and Revel, as points which, with military
aid, were open to attack. Much less was I prepared for
the withdrawal of the French squadron from the
combined naval operations almost instantaneously with the
departure of the army, so soon as Bomarsund had been
destroyed." And he refers to a report made by General
Jones, to the effect that Sweaborg might be successfully
attacked, in which opinion Gen. Baraguay d'Hilliers
had concurred. Sir James Graham closes this letter by
remarkingcthat an effort should have been made by the
combined forces of the allies, but that as the French
squadron was on its way home, nothing now remained
but gradually to withdraw the line of battle-ships, and
to await the moment when ice should enclose the Russian
fleet within the Gulf of Finland for the winter.

Sir Charles's reply is dated from Kiel, on the 27th of
October. He tells Sir James Graham that on the 29th
of August he announced to him the intention of the
French General to withdraw the troops. "I agreed (he
says) with the French General and Admiral, that
Sweaborg could not be attacked at this season of the
year; and I have no hesitation in saying, had we moved
the troops and ships up to Miolo Roads, and landed
5000 men, we should not have brought off one man, and
how many ships we should have lost I cannot say."
And he observes that after the capture and destruction
of Bomarsund till he left Nargen, there had not been
three days fit for operations that required seven or
eight. Sir C. Napier denies that the decision not to
attack Sweaborg was taken on the spot, and declares
that General Jones's report made no change whatever in
their opinions. Sir Charles further adds, that the
opinions of the French General and General Jones were
entirely opposed to each other, and not in accordance, as
Sir J. Graham had stated. Sir Charles goes on to
observe: " The truth is, the troops came too late—too
many for Bomarsund, too few for Sweaborg. The
cholera got amongst them. General Jones made a
proposal which the Generals declined acting on. The
people in England were dissatisfied, and, as some one
must be blamed, the Government want to throw it on
me, but I will not accept it." Referring again to the
lateness of the season and the continuation of bad
weather, the Admiral says: "Had people considered one
moment, they would have seen the impracticability of the
attempt; but they thought Sebastopol was taken, and I
must take Sweaborg, Revel, and Cronstadt. After the
French Generals had reconnoitred Sweaborg, I examined
it again, and sent home my opinion as to how it ought to
be attacked—by ships, batteries, gun-boats, mortar-boats,
&c, at great length; and the Admiralty, as if anxious
to get up a case against me, take it into their heads that
I meant to attack it with the fleet alone, and were
going to send back the French squadron and Admiral
Plumridge's ships; and though I have remonstrated,
they persist in still thinking so, and you, Sir James,
seem to have fallen into the same error. You say,
'then came your own second reconnaissance, and a plan
of naval attack, which you considered practicable.' Had
I seen the smallest chance of success, I should have
attacked without the French, but I did not; and surely
my opinion is worth more than a general of engineers;
but the Admiralty seem to think different. The general
talked of destroying Sweaborg in two hours. It is
much more likely the ships would have been set fire to
by red-hot shot and shells, and some of them on shore
by that time. Be assured it is a most difficult place to
attack, and whoever does it will have a hard nut to
crack. No admiral has, as yet, ventured to attack such
a fortress, defended as it is by art and nature. The
sunken rocks alone, combined with the smoke from the
guns and steamers, is no bad defence." After replying
to some observations of Sir J. Graham, respecting the
risks and dangers of warfare, Sir C. Napier reminds the
First Lord of his previous commendations on the score
of the Admiral's prudence: "All the summer, Sir
James, you were cautioning me, and so were the
Government, not to risk my ships against stone walls, for
which you had a great respect, and praising me for the
manner I had conducted the fleet; now winter is come,
you are dissatisfied at my not doing impossibilities; and
as the people are not satisfied, the Government are
preparing to abandon me, because I will not follow the
advice of a general, contrary to that of my own
admirals, and diametrically opposite to the opinion of the
French general of engineers, and attack a fortress at a
season of the year when it is more than probable I
should have lost half my fleet." Sir Charles winds up