along with Mr. Keating's, the Bills of Exchange and
Promissory Notes Bill (which had the same object), to a
select committee.—Sir F. THESIGER was ready to
consent to the second reading of both bills, upon the
understanding that they should be submitted to the same
select committee, which might accomplish the object of
preventing frauds in commercial transactions of this
kind.—The LORD-ADVOCATE, avowing that the bill had
his most complete approbation, justified its adoption of
the principles of the Scotch law.—Mr. H. KEATING
defended the machinery in his own bill, but approved of
the suggestion to send both bills to a select committee.—
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL said he thought the subject
had been pretty well exhausted. That fraudulent
defences to bills of exchange were an evil none denied, or
that a more summary remedy was necessary, unless
great commercial mischief would ensue. Then came the
question, which of the two bills, both having the same
object, should be adopted? He could not help thinking
that there were serious drawbacks upon the Scotch
system, which appeared cumbersome and complicated;
but, without discussing the relative merits of the two
bills, he thought they could not do better than refer
them both to a select committee.—The house divided,
and the second reading was carried by 114 to 58; the
bill was then ordered to be referred to a select committee.
—The same course was followed with respect to the Bills
of Exchange and Promissory Notes Bill.

Mr. FREWEN, in moving the second reading of the
Union of Benefices Bill, explained the state of the law
in regard to pluralities, pointing out what he considered
to be its defects and inconsistencies, and stating the
remedies he proposed in the bill.—Mr. COWPER said
that the changes proposed were unnecessary, and were
open to many inconveniences, and that the bill did not
carry out the intentions of the mover; he went through
the clauses, suggesting, as he proceeded, objections to
the details. He moved to defer the second reading for
six months.—Mr. R. Phillimore and Mr. Spooner spoke
in favour of the second reading of the bill, which was
opposed by Mr. Bouverie and Mr. Henley, and upon a
division, the amendment was carried by 112 to 30; so
the bill is lost.

Mr. WRIGHTSON moved the second reading of the
Vacating of Seats in Parliament Bill.—Its further
progress was resisted by Mr. W. Williams and Mr.
Bankes.—Sir G. GREY defended the bill, the sole
object of which was to promote the public convenience,
not that of individual members.—Mr. HADFIELD moved
to defer the second reading for six months.—The bill
was opposed by Mr. Bentinck, Mr. Barrow, Mr. Henley,
Sir F. Thesiger, and Lord Lovaine; and supported by
Mr. S. Wortley, Mr. B. Denison, and Mr. Deedes.—
Upon a division, the amendment was carried by 73 to
69; so this bill is lost.

On Thursday, March 29, Mr. SCOTT moved for copies
of instructions to the commander-in-chief in the
Mediterranean and Black Sea, and correspondence relative to
the Attack on Odessa. He arraigned the whole policy
pursued towards that port, and replied by anticipation
to the objections which might be offered to the production
of the papers. For the sake of Admiral Dundas
himself he wanted to know, he said, what were his
instructions, and whether he had or not ample discretion.
—Sir C. WOOD said the same reasons which induced
him to object altogether to the motion, precluded him
from replying to any portion of the speech of Mr. Scott
which had the slightest reference to his motion. If
there had been any correspondence or instructions upon
this subject, to produce them would at once disclose to
the enemy the views and intentions of our commanders
as to the probability or the reverse of an attack on
Odessa. He objected to such disclosures while hostilities
were in operation.—Mr. STAFFORD observed that the
papers would amply vindicate the admiral, whose
silence, he remarked, contrasted favourably with some
examples.—Mr. SCOTT disclaimed any intention of
casting the slightest slur upon Admiral Dundas.—Lord
PALMERSTON said the character of Admiral Dundas
stood high as an officer of her Majesty's naval service,
and there was no part of his conduct while employed
that had not done honour to him.

Mr. H. Berkley moved an address to her Majesty,
praying that she will be pleased to order a Court
Martial on Earl Lucan for ordering a charge of the
Light Cavalry at the battle of Balaklava. The object
of the motion, he said, was to ascertain the cause of the
destruction of 300 as gallant men as ever drew sword
or put foot in stirrup, who appeared to have been
wantonly sacrificed; he asked not for a committee
of that house, but for the proper tribunal for such an
inquiry—namely, a court-martial. He had no animosity
or personal feeling in this matter; he had no charge to
make against the honour or courage of Lord Lucan; he
would admit both to be undoubted; but he believed
inquiry to be called for, and this was the only course he
could take to obtain it. He then proceeded to detail
the particulars of the battle of Balaklava and the order
issued by Lord Raglan, observing that the more that
order was analysed the clearer did Lord Raglan's
intentions become. In the first place, no order was
given to charge by Lord Raglan, but to follow and try
to prevent the enemy from carrying away the guns.
The mode of doing this was left entirely to Lord Lucan.
The order could not apply to a stationary force, and the
permission to send for a troop of artillery showed further
the real intention of Lord Raglan. The fact was, Mr.
Berkeley said, that Lord Lucan was ordered to do one
thing, the necessity for which had passed away, and, on
his own responsibility, he did another, and that the
worst thing he could have done. He then related the
transmission of the order to Lord Cardigan (upon whose
military character he pronounced a very high eulogium);
the demur of Lord Cardigan upon the receipt of the
order, who pointed out the desperate nature of the
attack; and the fatal issue of the charge. In
conclusion, he submitted to the house that he had made out
a case for inquiry, which Lord Lucan himself gallantly
desired, and, if he could justify himself, a court-martial
was the proper place.—Lord ELCHO seconded the
motion, observing that Lord Lucan courted inquiry into
his conduct, and he (Lord Elcho) was never more
firmly convinced of anything than that Lord Lucan was
a grossly wronged and injured man.—Mr. C. VILLIERS
said he took issue with the mover and seconder upon
the question as to Lord Lucan's right to inquiry in this
matter. This did not come under the character of an
original motion, but under that of an appeal from
a decision given by the crown, by the advice of the
competent authorities. The question might have been
raised in another form; but it had been raised upon the
precise point decided by the authorities, with a perfect
knowledge that it had been already decided, and of
what were the reasons assigned for the refusal of a
court-martial. He briefly stated the case, which had
been submitted to the legal authorities, and the reasons
for refusing inquiry. No officer, he observed, had a
right to insist upon a court-martial; an officer might be
dismissed without reason assigned. In Lord Lucan's
case no military offence had been proved or alleged,
and, if he had offended, he had been continued to be
employed after the offence; and where an offence has
been overlooked, it is a good leading bar to any
proceeding against the party, who could not be subjected
to a court-martial for the offence so overlooked.
Independently of this legal objection, the inquiry would
be inexpedient. It could not be instituted at home,
and it was obvious that it must be deferred until the
war was over. The whole question was whether Lord
Raglan had exercised his discretion wisely. Lord
Raglan did not complain of Lord Lucan; all he said
was that in the particular charge in question he had
misconceived his order. Commanders-in-chief must be
invested with very large discretion, and if Lord Raglan
had exercised his discretion unworthily, Lord Lucan
was not without his remedy.–Mr. DISRAELI hoped the
motion would not be pressed to a division. Although
he sympathised with the feelings of Lord Lucan, whose
qualities entitled him to public respect, the house, in
regard to this motion, must, he said, look to its nature.
If there had been a denial of justice, it would be the
duty of the house to consider the case; but he could not
conceive that this was a case in which it ought to
interfere with the prerogative of the crown. There was
one point upon which he thought the house of commons
had a right to complain—namely, that when the thanks