the cavalry and artillery officers objected to it; and
large contracts for hay were made in England. One
of their greatest difficulties arose from the want of
depôts and magazines. Hulks might have been used,
but they were not thought of out there; or some of the
houses at Balaklava might have been told off. Sir
Charles held that the commissariat was not to blame
for the unroasted coffee, as the officers themselves
recommended that it should be issued unroasted. With
regard to the porter, it was found too bulky to be
supplied to the troops when they were not accessible
by water-carriage; and before the army left Varna the
supply had been discontinued by Lord Raglan, for
sanitary reasons.—At the close of his evidence, Sir
Charles Trevelyan stated that he had improved the old
commissariat system, especially in the choice of tried
clerks; but he thought the time had arrived when we
should adopt the French system, and consolidate the
different branches of our system on the model of the
French "intendance."

Sir Charles Trevelyan's examination was continued
on the 20th, when he went into further details respecting
the causes which had produced disasters. They
were, in his opinion, the following:—First, the omission
to make a main road from the camp to the base of
operations at Balaklava. This duty, according to the
Queen's regulations, ought to have been performed by
the quartermaster-general. Secondly, the absence of a
road along the borders of the harbour of Balaklava. This
duty also devolved on the quartermaster-general.
Thirdly, the absence of commissariat-magazines on the
shore at Balaklava; which it was also the business of
the quartermaster-general to provide. Fourthly, the
want of proper organisation of the transports and other
vessels in that harbour, and the consequent loss of the
Prince and other ships. For this the naval authorities
were responsible. Fifthly, the want of proper arrangements
for the transport service at Constantinople and in
the Black Sea; for which Admiral Boxer was responsible.
Sixthly, the passing suddenly, without proper
preparation, from a summer to a winter campaign. For
this likewise the quartermaster-general was responsible.
That officer ought also to have provided warm clothing
and huts for the troops. Seventhly, the vast amount
of articles which had to be carried up to the front in the
disastrous and broken-down state of affairs.

The Duke of Newcastle's examination commenced on
the 23rd. It was protracted to a great length, and
embraced a vast variety of particulars. It first related to his
powers and responsibilities as war minister. The general
direction of the war was in the hands of the secretary-
for-war. The duties of the commander-in-chief applied
more especially to the discipline of the army. In that
the secretary for war never interfered. The secretary-
at-war had the administration of the finance department
of the army. Occupying the official position of
secretary-at-war and for the colonies, it was his duty to
give directions for the movement of troops to the
Mediterranean. As regarded the movement of cavalry
and infantry, he communicated with the commander-in-
chief. As regarded the movement of the artillery, the
ambulance corps, and the sappers and miners, he
communicated with the master-general of the ordnance.
He also communicated with the treasury as to the
commissariat. His communications with reference to the
medical department, were generally conducted through
the secretary-at-war. The names of the officers
appointed to command were submitted to the Queen by
the commander-in-chief generally after consultation
with the administration, but there were exceptions, Lord
Lucan, and Brigadiers Torrens and Golding were
appointed without communication to the government,
through inadvertence on the part of Lord Hardinge;
and no official notice was taken of this circumstance.
As regarded the commissariat, his grace said that having
explained to those who had the management of that
department what the duties were to be performed, and
the amount of troops to be supplied, he expected them
to carry out the requisite arrangements for supplying
the amount of provisions and transports. As regarded
the stores, he looked in the same way to the master-
general of the ordnance, and to the board of ordnance
for the supply of stores; but, at the same time, he
did not mean to say that he by any means divested
himself of all care on these matters; for, with the
exception of supplies to the commissariat—that being
an independent department, he did not interfere
with it to the same extent that he did with others—
he took constant opportunities of inquiring into the
amount of stores ordered by each different department,
and occasions arose frequently in which he ordered the
quantities supplied to be even doubled in their amount.
The medical department also came under his notice, and
his attention was drawn to the number of medical
officers to be supplied to the army, within a few days
after the expedition was first determined on, by an
important letter from Dr. Guthrie published in the
Times. The duke then went into long and minute
details of his correspondence and communications with
the heads of the various departments on the subject of
supplies to the army, as soon as he was informed that
such supplies were necessary.

On the 24th the Duke of Newcastle's examination
was resumed. He said that he felt considerable
difficulties in transacting business, from the forms of
some of the subordinate departments, though he
superseded these forms in numerous instances. To
the best of his knowledge these forms still exist,
at least he does not know of any alteration being
made in them. The duke was then questioned
at great length touching the various kinds and
degrees of responsibility which attached to himself
as secretary-of-war, the commander-in-chief, and Lord
Raglan. The next topic was the hospital accommodation
for the troops. In regard to the abominable condition
of the hospital at Scutari, he considered that the "authorities
on the spot," those who had charge of the hospital,
were responsible. "I agree with Dr. Smith (said the
duke) that the army medical board is in no degree
satisfactorily constituted, and perhaps it requires as
much change as any of the military departments. I do
not think Dr. Smith was without any power that the
war-office could give him. I considered myself responsible
for everything. The public threw an unbounded
responsibility on me, and every public servant is responsible
for what he does, but I do not think that Dr.
Smith could be held responsible for the many evils, if
properly proved, that occurred at Scutari." He (the
duke) could only say he hardly received from two
persons the same opinions as to the origin of those evils.
No doubt the appointment of the various officers was
unfortunate, and he thought the blame of the state of
things at Scutari attached in a greater or less degree to
all connected with the hospital. The duke then went
into many particulars respecting the commissariat, the
transport service, and the medical department. He
concluded by saying that he did not consider there was
a want of power in the secretary-for-war so much as the
want of means. In short, the tools with which he had
to work were something like the intrenching tools, not
of the very best quality. He had been hampered by
his subordinates. "I am bound to say, however (he
added), that everybody under me evinced the greatest
cordiality towards me, and made the greatest efforts to
do their duty. I do not attach blame to any individual,
but I think the system is bad. I am satisfied that
everybody under me did the very best in his power."

The Duke of Newcastle's examination terminated on
Wednesday the 25th. A great part of it consisted of
explanations and amplifications of his previous statements.
The following were among the most remarkable
passages. On the subject of providing for the army
wintering in the Crimea, the duke said that it was
impossible to have any fixed idea as to the arrangements
necessary for the wintering of the army in the Crimea,
so long as the result of the siege of Sebastopol was
unknown; but admirable winter quarters, Sebastopol
being taken, might have been had in the south of the
Crimea, or the Bosphorus, and he provided for both
contingencies.—The chairman: How did you provide
for the contingency of winter in the Crimea?—The
duke: If they had taken Sebastopol, that contingency
would have provided for itself.—The chairman: Did
you provide for the contingency of not taking Sebastopol?
I cannot say.—The chairman: Because that
contingency has happened.—(A laugh.)—The duke: