the Sultan with reference to the settlement, which his
Highness had sanctioned, of the conflicting claims of the
Greek and Latin churches to a portion of the Holy
Places of Jerusalem and its neighbourhood. To the
complaint of the Emperor of Russia on this head justice
was done: and her Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople
had the satisfaction of promoting an arrangement
to which no exception was taken by the Russian Government.
But while the Russian Government repeatedly
assured the Government of her Majesty that the mission
of Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople was exclusively
directed to the settlement of the question of the Holy
Places at Jerusalem, Prince Menschikoff himself pressed
upon the Porte other demands of a far more serious
and important character, the nature of which he in the
first instance endeavoured, as far as possible, to conceal
from her Majesty's ambassador. And these demands,
thus studiously concealed, affected not the privileges of
the Greek Church at Jerusalem, but the position of
many millions of Turkish subjects in their relations to
their sovereign the Sultan. These demands were
rejected by the spontaneous decision of the Sublime Porte.
Two assurances had been given to her Majesty: one,
that the mission of Prince Menschikoff only regarded the
Holy Places; the other, that his mission would be of a
conciliatory character. In both respects her Majesty's
just expectations were disappointed. Demands were
made which, in the opinion of the Sultan, extended to
the substitution of the Emperor of Russia's authority
for his own, over a large portion of his subjects; and
those demands were enforced by a threat: and when her
Majesty learnt that, on announcing the termination of
his mission, Prince Menschikoff declared that the refusal
of his demands would impose upon the imperial government
the necessity of seeking a guarantee by its own
power, her Majesty thought proper that her fleet should
leave Malta, and, in co-operation with that of his
Majesty the Emperor of the French, take up its station
in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. So long as
the negotiation bore an amicable character her Majesty
refrained from any demonstration of force. But when,
in addition to the assemblage of large military forces on
the frontier of Turkey, the ambassador of Russia
intimated that serious consequences would ensue from the
refusal of the Sultan to comply with, unwarrantable
demands, her Majesty deemed it right, in conjunction
with the Emperor of the French, to give an unquestionable
proof of her determination to support the sovereign
rights of the Sultan. The Russian government has
maintained that the determination of the Emperor to
occupy the Principalities was taken in consequence of
the advance of the fleets of England and France. But
the menace of invasion of the Turkish territory was
conveyed in Count Nesselrode's note to Rechid Pacha of
the 19th (31st) May, and re-stated in his despatch to
Baron Brunnow of the 20th May (1st June), which
announced the determination of the Emperor of Russia to
order his troops to occupy the Principalities, if the Porte
did not within a week comply with the demands of
Russia. The despatch to her Majesty's ambassador at
Constantinople, authorising him in certain specified
contingencies to send for the British fleet, was dated the
31st May, and the order sent direct from England to her
Majesty's admiral to proceed to the neighbourhood of
the Dardanelles was dated the 2nd of June. The
determination to occupy the Principalities was therefore taken
before the orders for the advance of the combined
squadrons were given. The Sultan's minister was
informed that, unless he signed within a week, and without
the change of a word, the Note proposed to the Porte by
Prince Menschikoff on the eve of his departure from
Constantinople, the Principalities of Moldavia and
Wallachia would be occupied by Russian troops. The Sultan
could not accede to so insulting a demand; but when
the actual occupation of the Principalities took place,
the Sultan did not, as he might have done in the exercise
of his undoubted right, declare war, but addressed
a protest to his Allies. Her Majesty, in conjunction
with the Sovereigns of Austria, France, and Prussia, has
made various attempts to meet any just demands of the
Emperor of Russia without affecting the dignity and
independence of the Sultan; and had it been the sole
object of Russia to obtain security for the enjoyment by
the Christian subjects of the Porte of their privileges
and immunities, she would have found it in the offers
that have been made by the Sultan. But as that security
was not offered in the shape of a special and separate
stipulation with Russia, it was rejected. Twice has this
offer been made by the Sultan, and recommended by the
Four Powers: once by a Note originally prepared at
Vienna, and subsequently modified by the Porte; once
by the proposal of bases of negotiation agreed upon at
Constantinople on the 31st of December, and approved
at Vienna on the 13th of January, as offering to the two
parties the means of arriving at an understanding in a
becoming and honourable manner. It is thus manifest
that a right for Russia to interfere in the ordinary
relations of Turkish subjects to their sovereign, and not the
happiness of Christian communities in Turkey, was the
object sought for by the Russian government; to such
a demand the Sultan would not submit, and his highness,
in self-defence, declared war upon Russia: but her
Majesty nevertheless, in conjunction with her Allies,
has not ceased her endeavours to restore peace between
the contending parties. The time has, however, now
arrived when, the advice and remonstrances of the Four
Powers having proved wholly ineffectual, and the military
preparations of Russia becoming daily more
extended, it is but too obvious that the Emperor of Russia
has entered upon a course of policy which, if unchecked,
must lead to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. In
this conjuncture her Majesty feels called upon, by regard
for an ally, the integrity and independence of whose
empire have been recognised as essential to the peace of
Europe, by the sympathies of her people with right
against wrong, by a desire to avert from her dominions
most injurious consequences, and to save Europe from
the preponderance of a Power which has violated the
faith of treaties, and defies the opinion of the civilised
world, to take up arms in conjunction with the Emperor
of the French, for the defence of the Sultan. Her
Majesty is persuaded that in so acting she will have the
cordial support of her people; and that the pretext of
zeal for the Christian religion will be used in vain to
cover an aggression undertaken in disregard of its holy
precepts, and of its pure and beneficent spirit. Her
Majesty humbly trusts that her efforts may be successful,
and that, by the blessing of Providence, peace may be
re-established on safe and solid foundations."

The same Gazette contains an additional Declaration
respecting Neutrals, and Orders in Council to be
observed during the war. The Declaration states, that
the Queen "having been compelled to take up arms in
support of an ally, is desirous of rendering the war as
little onerous as possible to the Powers with whom she
remains at peace. To preserve the commerce of neutrals
from all unnecessary obstruction, her Majesty is willing
for the present, to waive a part of the belligerent rights
appertaining to her by the law of nations. It is impossible
for her Majesty to forego the exercise of her right
of seizing articles contraband of war, and of preventing
neutrals from bearing the enemy's despatches, and she
must maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent
neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may
be established with an adequate force against the
enemy's forts, harbours, or coasts. But her Majesty
will waive the right of seizing enemy's property laden
on board a neutral vessel, unless it be contraband of
war. It is not her Majesty's intention to claim the
confiscation of neutral property, not being contraband
of war, found on board enemy's ships, and her Majesty
further declares that, being anxious to lessen as much
as possible the evils of war, and to restrict its operations
to the regularly organised forces of the country, it is not
her present intention to issue letters of marque for the
commissioning of privateers."

The Orders in Council are three in number. The
first is technically termed an order of general reprisals;
and it is a formality which usually precedes the
commencement of hostilities between maritime Powers. Its
effect is, to authorise her Majesty's fleets and ships to
seize "all ships, vessels, and goods, belonging to the
Emperor of All the Russias, or his subjects, or others
inhabiting within any of his countries, territories, or
dominions, and bring the same to judgment" in the
Courts of Admiralty "duly commissionated to take