caves and hutted themselves; and there never were
move than 60 out of 1400 in hospital.

On Tuesday, May 1st, Sir John Burgoyne was
examined. He said he was Lieutenant–General on the
Staff in the Crimea; and while there he principally
directed the siege operations which were carried out by
officers of Engineers. He admitted that there were not
men enough to execute the works required. He
frequently applied for working parties, and could not get
them. The extent of the attack he undertook was
greater than the force could do with rapidity. He was
in hopes that the army would not be detained before the
place until the bad weather came; but after the first
day's fire he altered his opinion. As far as he knew, the
army landed in the Crimea without any knowledge of the
Russian force, but it was always evident that sooner or
later the Russians could receive great reinforcements.
It was thought necessary to take advantage of the
impression made at Alma to commence siege operations as
soon as possible, with every available means, and under
these circumstances it was not desirable to employ the
working parties in the construction of the road. It was
not within the scope of his duties to make a representation
to the authorities, either here or in the Crimea, to
the effect that they were furnished with too small
an amount of men to carry on the duties of the siege.
He never made any specific representation, but was
constantly applying for men to reinforce the working–
parties, but the Adjutant–General told him he could not
afford them, not having a sufficient strength at command.
He did mention to Lord Raglan that he had to
carry on the siege works without an adequate working
force. He had the supreme direction of the engineering
plans, but not of the details. To a certain extent he was
in command, and the siege operations were entirely
under his control. The failure of the first attack took
place on the 17th October. Though he and Commissary
Filder were at Lord Raglan's head–quarters on the 8th
November, they did not know then that the army would
have to winter in the Crimea; but there was no
consultation as to the propriety of making a road. If Lord
Raglan found the force insufficient for making the road,
he could have sent home for men. Navigators would
have been useful, and it would have been a better measure
if, early in November, 1500 navvies had been sent
out to make the road, than the subsequent construction
of the railway. They would have been of great service
in putting the road in order, but unfortunately it was
not thought of. It was the Quartermaster–General's
strict duty to make roads, but he always had engineering
assistance. He (Sir J. Burgoyne) never made any
remonstrance to Lord Raglan as to the absence of the
road. The inconvenience of the road was greatly felt
after the battle of Inkermann—the full inconvenience
was then felt. The road became worse and worse, and
at last was unavailable for pack–horses, which fell down
and died. The road was one of the greatest difficulties
the army sustained, and caused great delay and privation.
It was a very serious ill, and it would have been
desirable at any cost to have improved it. All this was
the fault of our military institutions, which, in his opinion,
in the field were notoriously insufficient. After the
failure of the first fire before Sebastopol, Lord Raglan
consulted him as to the next step to be taken, and he
(Sir J. Burgoyne) was not of opinion that heavier
ordnance would be required, as it was very heavy as it
was. The deficiency that existed was not in the calibre
of the guns so much as their quantity. The reason they
did not expect to winter in Sebastopol was the expectation
that the increased ammunition would have been
successfully instrumental to its capture. When he
formed the opinion they would have to stay the winter,
he communicated it to Lord Raglan. The weak state
of the army, and the state of the weather and roads,
prevented the batteries from opening fire, and compelled
them to stay the winter. It was not possible to employ
soldiers in making the road without taking them off
more important duties. It had been his opinion some
time that the whole of our military institutions were
insufficient, and that they undertook the war in the
Crimea under those circumstances. He was so far
consulted as to the army going to the Crimea that he was
out in the country beforehand and made a report. He
was not consulted as to the chances of success of an
attack on Sebastopol before the attack was made, and he
gave no official opinion on that subject. He would
rather not give an opinion as to the sufficiency of the
allied forces for undertaking the expedition to the Crimea.
The ground on which the army was encamped before
Sebastopol was selected by the Quartermaster–General,
but that of the siege operations by the engineering
department. The Russian plan of defence had nothing
new in it; it had been in existence for hundreds of
years; it was simply the construction of earthworks
in front of the fortress, which were not equal
to masonry as a means of defence. The flank movement
made by the army across the country after they
landed in the Crimea he thought was rightly planned
and properly executed.

On Wednesday, May 2, Mr. Grant, Comptroller of the
Victualling Department of the Admiralty, was examined.
He enumerated the articles which composed the supplies
sent out to the troops, and, with respect to their quality,
he could not call to his recollection any other complaint
being made than that about the port wine. When the
Admiralty was first asked to send out unroasted coffee
for the army witness was surprised; and on the 27th of
February, 1851, he wrote to Commissary Filder to know
if unroasted coffee was what he wanted. Mr. Filder
replied that he had consulted several military officers
on the subject, who were of opinion that it would be
better to send the coffee out in an unroasted state; and
that whatever inconvenience might be found on roasting
and grinding it, he had no doubt would be overcome by
the men finding substitutes for ovens and mills. Witness
caused six coffee–mills to be sent out for grinding
coffee in the army. These mills were a little larger
than those in ordinary domestic use. He did not recollect
any case in which complaint had been made of a
want of fair play in dealing with the samples. It had
never been brought to his knowledge that persons in
the Admiralty office had accepted bribes. If the bulk
was not equal to the sample it was rejected, and that
frequently occurred. On the assumption that the
people concerned were rogues, it was possible that the
bulk might be changed in its transit to the place of
shipment, or at the place of shipment. In conclusion
the witness stated that the Admiralty, to secure themselves
against further fraud, were establishing factories
for different articles.

On Thursday and Friday, May 3 and 4, Sir Thomas
Hastings, the Ordnance Storekeeper, was examined at
great length. His evidence showed the total absence
of system in the war and ordnance departments. For
instance, he stated, that, when the change took place in
the management of the war department, on the appointment
of a war minister, the ordnance office received no
information on the subject beyond what it gathered
from the public newspapers. He added that a written
application which he made for an interview with Lord
Panmure, on that nobleman's accession to office, and a
subsequent personal application to Lord Panmure's
private secretary to the same effect, were both allowed
to remain unanswered, and that a letter he wrote in
consequence received no reply. He also stated that
on one occasion the secretary–at–war and the secretary–
for–war were actually bidding against each other in the
market for a supply of fur caps. Sir Thomas, moreover,
told the committee that the requisitions for warm
clothing, made in June by the board of ordnance to
the secretary–for–war, were partly verbal and partly in
writing, and that the verbal requisitions were not
reduced to writing till some months later.

Sir Thomas Hastings continued his evidence on
Friday the 4th and Monday the 7th. The chief points
of his examination related to the administration of the
ordnance department. His evidence went to show that
the board of ordnance had worked with remarkable
steadiness until the appointment of a separate ministry
of war, when the clerk of the ordnance began to govern
the board through the minister–of–war. Various cases
were mentioned in which Sir Thomas differed from the
Duke of Newcastle, Lord Panmure, and Mr. Monsell.
One thing was very evident, that the board of ordnance
has been practically in a transition state for the last
twelvemonth; and that there have been several