irregularities, or rather departures from routine. Sir
Thomas thought that the minister–of–war had acted
illegally in interfering with the details of the ordnance
department. He also dwelt much on the fact that the
master–general is in the Crimea; and that Sir Hew
Ross, the lieutenant–general, feels doubts as to the
extent of his powers; although Sir Thomas thought
that Sir Hew Ross succeeded, by his patent, to all the
rights exercised by the master–general. The result of
his evidence was, that it is as difficult, in his opinion,
"to carry on successfully the administration of the
ordnance department without a master–general and a
complete board, as it would be to carry on the
administration of the navy without a chief lord and a board of
admiralty."

Mr. Monsell, clerk of the ordnance, was examined on
Monday and Tuesday, the 7th and 8th. Much of his
evidence was elicited to show the state of the ordnance
department during the past year, and to throw light
upon a kind of conflict between Mr. Monsell, backed by
the minister–of–war, and Sir Thomas Hastings. He
said that, at the beginning of the war, the board of
ordnance was not in a condition to meet the urgent
demands upon them, because their supply of stores in
hand was deficient. The difficulties that had arisen
lately must be attributed rather to the fact that the
board is in a moribund state, as it is known that large
changes are contemplated. Mr. Monsell most fully
concurred with the Duke of Newcastle in the dissatisfaction
he felt with the organisation of the board. But
he did not think the absence of the master–general
caused that state of things. The secretary of state
interfered to decide what should be done. If he had
not interfered as he did, by giving constant orders,
however irregularly, verbally, or on slips of paper, our
army would have been even in a worse state than the
lamentable condition it was in from want of clothing
and necessaries.

Mr. Sidney Herbert's examination occupied the
whole of Wednesday, the 9th. Questioned with respect
to the power he exercised as secretary–at–war, he said
that the effect of the separation of the offices of war and
the colonies did not so much diminish the power of the
secretary–at–war, as it did the exercise of powers "not
strictly warranted by his official position, but which in
a long course of years had grown upon him." Strictly
he was a financial officer; and the office, at its origin,
was simply a delegation from the treasury, which has
still supreme control over the expenditure of the army.
Examined with respect to the expedition to the Crimea,
he said that the expectation was in favour of a coup–de–
main, and not a long campaign. The troops went to
the Crimea in light order; but he had nothing to do
with the preparations. "When the departments were
separated, he placed himself at the disposal of Lord
Aberdeen, with the view of facilitating changes; and
subsequently he undertook a good deal of business, to
relieve the Duke of Newcastle, which properly it was
not the business of his office to do. In this way a dispute
came under his notice between Dr. A. Smith and Mr.
Guthrie as to whether additional staff–surgeons or
regimental–surgeons should be appointed. After hearing
the discussion, witness referred the matter to Lord
Raglan, who decided in favour of taking additional
regimental–surgeons. As it had turned out, it would have
been better to have had, as Dr. A. Smith suggested,
additional staff–surgeons. After the battle of the Alma,
hearing that the hospitals at Scutari had failed, at a
time when contradictory statements were made, Mr.
Herbert wrote unofficially to Dr. Menzies, Major Sillery,
and Mr. Wreford, urging them to simplify forms and
procure what they could on the spot; to provide for the
influx of patients, and see that nothing was wanting for
their comfort. He also wrote to Lord Stratford, urging
him to give assistance. He felt that a high military
officer should be placed over the hospital, in place of
Major Sillery; and such an officer was selected, but in
the meantime Lord Raglan had appointed a "good
man,"—Lord William Paulet. Questions were put with
the view of obtaining an opinion respecting Lord
Raglan's responsibility in the matter, especially as he
had supreme control in the East. But Mr. Herbert
stated that Dr. Hall had visited Scutari, by Lord
Raglan's directions, and on his return he gave a
"flourishing account" of it; so that Lord Raglan could
not remonstrate about deficiencies of which he was not
aware. With respect to the medical men, Mr. Herbert
retained his opinion that as medical men they exerted
themselves well, but that as organisers they broke down.
All the departments were underhanded; but originally
"too much was expected and too little was done."
Somebody was to blame, certainly; but it is difficult to
pitch upon the right man. With respect to the hospital
at Smyrna, Mr. Herbert said he should have preferred
Sinope. There was a doubt as to the healthiness of
Smyrna, and therefore it had not been permanently
established, but it is at present working admirably.
Mr. Herbert at an early period took part in providing
clothing for the army, sheep–skin coats, &c. Some of
the "ammunition boots" supplied by the colonels were
too small, but the ordnance boots were large enough.
Much of the clothing was obtained in Austria and
Switzerland, and for that the ordnance cannot be held
responsible. He explained that in cases where contracts
for clothing entered into by the colonels have not
expired, the troops continue to be supplied by them.
In reply to questions from Mr. Roebuck and Mr.
Layard, Mr. Herbert said that, with the exception of
one whole week and part of another, he was in town
throughout the recess, in constant communication with
the Duke of Newcastle, and acting as a "volunteer
assistant" to him.

Mr. Wood, secretary to the board of ordnance, was
examined on Thursday, the 10th. He said that he was
not aware of the inconvenience, as regarded the current
business of the board, arising from the absence of Lord
Raglan, the Master–General.—Vice–Admiral Dundas
was also called on that day, and examined at considerable
length. He commanded the Mediterranean fleet.
On the 8th of June he was ordered to Besika Bay; on
the 30th October he went on to the Bosphorus, and
entered the Black Sea in January. Until the war
broke out, he was at the orders of the ambassador.
After the war broke out, he took his orders from the
French admiral, who was his senior officer. Examined
with respect to the information supplied to or obtained
by him with respect to the strength of the Russian
fleet, he said that he was supplied with a very "rough
old statement" at first; that when he entered the
Black Sea, he was not a bit the wiser; that he informed
Lord Stratford, in July, 1853, that he had a Maltese
who could get the information required by going to
Sebastopol; but that Lord Stratford interposed difficulties
—"something relating to passports." He thought
the ambassador ought to have sent that man. He had
endeavoured to collect information, but with little
success; and he attributed his failure to the vigilance
and caution of the Russian government, and the hostility
of the Greeks. About the end of July he first heard of
the expedition to the Crimea, and prepared accordingly;
but the cholera broke out in the fleet, and delayed the
sailing of the expedition. All the ships carried troops,
except seven sail of the line, held in readiness to meet
the Russians. It was arranged that the French should
have a proportionate number in readiness; but they
were compelled to carry French troops. He seemed
much hurt at a statement made by the Duke of
Newcastle, that the admiral had sent "inaccurate"
information as to the strength of the enemy in the Crimea;
and read letters of his own to Sir James Graham to
show that he was right. One of these, addressed to Sir
James Graham, and dated in May, 1854, stated that
Sebastopol was a second Gibraltar; that there were
130,000 Russian troops in the Crimea, and 30,000 in the
fortress itself, which was further protected by thirteen
or fourteen sail of the line. The fleet could not get near
Perekop; and it was impossible to prevent the entrance
of Russian troops to the Crimea by the Sea of Azoff,
without 4000 men; and these could not be spared.
Asked whether he had sufficient means of transport to
convey the necessary equipment of the army; he said
that he had not; and to repeated questions, he answered
that additional transport could not have been obtained
"in time," either by himself or the ministry at home.
With respect to Balaklava, the only complaint he ever
heard was that the harbour was "a ditch;" that it was