their duty and made great sacrifices, but he could not
say the same of the British parliament. "Occasionally
in that body men arose who were indisposed to the
prosecution of the war; some were for peace at any
price, and some were for war at half-price. But war
could not be had at half-price, for if the war were
starved it was impossible for success to follow. Others,
again, high in power, were for war while it was
prosperous, but shrank from pursuing it when it was
disastrous, and did not hesitate to call upon those whom
they had plunged into war to extricate them by what
must ever be considered a most disastrous peace. Whilst
such was the state of things at home, our soldiers abroad
never flinched, never wavered, and were now triumphant.
Many a man at home had been saying at one time that
we couldn't, and at another that we shouldn't or
wouldn't, take Sebastopol; but here we are with Sebastopol
in our hands. It would be remembered, however,
that though Sebastopol had fallen, the time had not yet
arrived when we could safely turn our swords into
ploughshares. The country must still be prepared to
give its money, and also the real sinews of war, in fresh
supplies of gallant men, to carry on the fight. There
must now be no hesitation, no wavering; but we must
gird up our loins for the fight, and put our trust in the
god of battles."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer presided, on the
2nd inst., over the annual meeting of the Radnorshire
Agricultural Society. In proposing the toast, "The
Allied Fleets and Armies," he reviewed the Events of
the War during the Past Year. "It is now just about
a year since the expedition upon which the eyes of all
England and all Europe are riveted—the expedition to
Sebastopol—sailed. That expedition was perhaps
framed with rather sanguine views of the possibility of
success, considering the numbers by which it was undertaken.
Nevertheless, it would have been possible for
it to have succeeded very shortly after the landing of the
allied armies. Such success was within the range, I
will not say of possibility, but of probability. The
sanguine hopes of those who contrived and ordered the
expedition were not, however, fulfilled. We saw the
painful spectacle of our gallant army during last
winter exposed to such trials, to such hardships, and to
such privations, as scarcely any civilised army was ever
before exposed to. We were told that those hardships
and privations were in a great measure owing to the
neglect or the want of skill in those who guided and
those who governed and provided for the wants of that
expedition. I am not now going to enter into that
much-debated, much-discussed, and much-controverted
question. I will only shortly express to you my opinion
— an opinion not founded on superficial grounds—that a
large portion of the sufferings of our army was owing
rather to the inherent difficulties of the expedition itself,
rather to the manner in which it was undertaken, rather
to the failure of immediate success, than to any want of
ability or of skill in the persons who immediately
superintended it. I don't mean to exculpate all the persons
who were concerned in the government of that expedition:
it would have been wonderful, after so many years
of peace, if they suddenly found themselves fitted for
the greatest of military enterprises. I don't mean to
say that they attained that state of administrative
perfection which much longer experience would scarcely
have enabled them to reach. I will only say, I feel
that those persons who have bestowed so much harsh
criticism on the conductors of that expedition did not
make sufficient allowances for the difficulties which
were inherent in the enterprise itself. After a time, the
treaty into which this country and France had entered
with Austria rendered it incumbent upon us to
commence negotiations at Vienna, with a view to see
whether, during the pendency of the war, while the siege
was still carried on before the walls of Sebastopol, some
means could not be found which should put an end to
hostilities. The course which was taken by this country
in the negotiations at Vienna was pursued with steadiness
and consistency throughout. No change took place
in the terms which were offered by this country and
France to Russia. Those terms were refused, and others
were offered on the part of Russia. The result of those
conferences was, that her Majesty's government, looking
at the circumstances of the contending powers—to
the position of the armies at Sebastopol, and to the
duty which they owed to their country—thought no
good would arise from their continuance; and they were
therefore broken off. Since that time, the war with
Russia has been prosecuted with all the vigour which
this country, with its great resources, could command;
it has been prosecuted with all those more extensive
military resources which the great population and the
great military organisation of France puts at the
disposal of her government; and the result we all know.
The great fortress—the object of a year's contention
between the great powers of Europe—has fallen: and
the fleet, the arsenals, and the great military preparations
of Russia, are in the hands of the allies. We may
now ask, whether the terms which we, in combination
with France, offered to Russia, were not fair and
reasonable terms; and whether it would not have been for
the interest of that haughty and aggressive power rather
to have accepted those terms than to have waited the
event which has now been developed. I have seen with
great regret, during the last week, the comments which
have been made by various critics of our own country
on the share which our gallant army has borne in the
attack upon Sebastopol. We do not grudge the laurels
which France has deservedly earned in the assault of
that place. There has been no rivalry, no unseemly
competition between the two armies; it has been
co-operation, and not jealousy or rivalry. The most generous,
the most noble feelings, have been exhibited by
the armies to each other—not only by the men but by
the generals and officers. But while we willingly
recognise the glory and honour of France in the achievements
which placed the tower of Malakhoff, the key to
the fortress, in the hands of the French attacking party,
we must not allow unfair disparagement to be thrown
upon our own army. The remarks to which I have
alluded have not come from the French critics. On the
contrary, I read with satisfaction in a newspaper the
remarks of a French military critic, in which he said
that the English troops had in the attack on the Great
Redan done all that troops could by possibility accomplish.
Can anybody doubt that our army has from the
beginning shown the greatest gallantry, the greatest
hardihood and enterprise on all occasions, whether offensive
or defensive? We must wait for the more detailed
official accounts, hereafter to be sent by the generals,
before we are in a position to pass any judgment of
condemnation on our own gallant troops. We must remember
that the attack which they made effected a powerful
diversion of the enemy, and to a certain extent assisted
the French in maintaining that portion of the works
which they had gained, and that at the close of the day
the Redan was in the possession of the allies. Nothing
can more dishearten a gallant army at a distance from
our shores than captious and censorious criticisms, when
they feel they have shed their best blood in the defence
of their country. I trust that the best feelings of the
country will be enlisted in their behalf, and that everything
that we can do in the way of admiration and
sympathy will be willingly bestowed upon them."

Lord Palmerston, on the 5th, received at Romsey an
address of congratulation on the successes in the Crimea.
In his reply, he spoke vigorously on the Prosecution of
the War.—"The fall of Sebastopol," he said, "must
inspire joy and exultation in the breast of every generous
freeman on the surface of the globe." He dilated on
the magnitude of the contest,—"We have been fighting
the whole military force of the Russian empire; and we
have possessed ourselves of the prize for which we have
been fighting,—blood-stained ruins, truly, but containing
vast supplies of warlike material. Why was that
material collected? because the Russians felt that this
Sebastopol was the stronghold of their power in the
East; that from that centre was to radiate that intense
and extensive power which was to lead them to the
conquest of Constantinople, and to enable them from that
centre of empire to sway in a great degree the destinies
of Europe." He contrasted the evils arising from
submission to grasping ambition and triumphant violence
with the calamities of war; and drew a picture of
England and France, "the two greatest nations in the
world," forgetting their former rivalry, and uniting to